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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which sev-
eral Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the con-
tinuous time setting. We show that optimal contracts should satisfy some
equilibrium conditions andwe reduce the optimisation problem of the Prin-
cipals to a system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. We
provide conditions ensuring that for risk-neutral Principals, the system of
coupled HJB equations admits a solution. Further, we apply our study in a
more specific linear-quadratic model where two interacting Principals hire
one common Agent. In this continuous time model, we extend the result
of [BW86] in which the authors compare the optimal effort of the Agent
in a non-cooperative Principals model and that in the aggregate model, by
showing that these two optimisations coincide only in the first best case (see
Proposition 5.2). We also study the sensibility of the optimal effort and the
optimal remunerations with respect to appetence parameters and the corre-
lation between the projects (see Proposition 5.3).
Key words: Moral hazard models, common agency, system of HJB equa-
tions.
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1 Introduction
In 2016, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Services (IPBES for short) deeply investigated1 pollinators and pollinisation
processes in food production issues. To illustrate the motivation of our study in
the light of the report of the IPBES, consider for instance one field divided for
planting various crops each of them managed by an owner (she). It interests the
owners to collaborate with a beekeeper (he) to ensure a better yield. In this case,
the beekeeper distributes his beehives in the fields for the different crops, and
manage to improve, through the pollination, the production of the crop-owners.
Therefore, each crop-owner has to provide the beekeeper sufficiently good incen-
tives to take care of her crop. The situation in this example typically illustrates a
common agency problem with information asymmetry, that is, the crop-owners
need to design contracts to motivate the beekeeper, each hoping of improving
her own production, without observing directly how the beekeeper and his bees
impact the crops. The crop-owners play thus the role of the Principals and the
beekeeper can be seen as an Agent, in the so-called multi-Principals/Agent prob-
lem and more generally in the theory of incentives.
1see the report [PIFN+16] approved by the Plenary of IPBES at its fourth session in Kuala
Lumpur.
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The theory of incentives or contract theory appeared in the 70’s with the work of
Mirrlees [Mir76] among others, by studying optimal payments schedule between
two economical entities under imperfect observations on the performances of the
employee who manages the employer’s wealth. This has been investigated later
in the textbook of Laffont and Tirole [LT93] with illustrations in regulation sys-
tems and the underlying game played between the two parties, and we refer to
the survey book of Laffont and Martimort [LM09] for a lot of relevant examples
related to this theory. More precisely, the situation with moral hazard considered
in contract theory can be described as follows. The Principal (she) wants to hire
another entity, namely the Agent (he), to manage a project. Also, the Agent has
a reservation utility which allows him to accept or reject the contract proposed
by the Principal. The main difficulty encountered by the Principal is that she is
potentially not well-informed toward the work of her Agent. Therefore, we need
to distinguish two types of problems. First, we may assume that the Principal
controls both the effort of the Agent and the optimal remuneration proposed to
him. This situation fits with a risk-sharingmodel, called first-best. In this case, we
only investigate the problem of the Principal who chooses an optimal effort and
an optimal remuneration under the reservation utility constrain of the Agent. In
most of the situations, the Principal has no access to observe the effort of her
agent, but only observe the outcome of his work. The problem of the Princi-
pal is thus to design an optimal contract maximizing her utility among all the
contracts satisfying the Agent’s reservation utility, without observing, not to say
controlling, his effort. This more realistic situation is called moral hazard prob-
lem or second-best. In practice, we identify this game between the Agent and the
Principal with a Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e. given any fixed contract, the Agent
has the corresponding best reaction, and based on these predictable reactions the
Principal choose the best contract in order to maximize her utility.
The researches made in the 70’s related to contract theory mainly treat the prob-
lem in a discrete time framework with one or more periods, i.e. the effort of the
Agent, the outcome, and all other relevant quantity take values in a finite space.
Hölmstrom and Milgrom studied a continuous time model in the seminal paper
[HM87] in which they consider a Brownianmodel for the wealth process, and as-
sume the Principal does the optimization with the exponential utility. This work
has then been extended by many other authors. Schättler and Sung in [SS93]
provided first-order sufficient conditions to solve the problem. Sung in [Sun95]
investigated this issue when the Agent can control the diffusion of the output.
Then, Hellwig and Schmidt in [HS01] made a link between the discrete time and
continuous time models. All these papers used sophisticated tools of stochas-
tic control theory such as dynamic programming and martingale approach. For
more details, we refer to the survey paper of Sung [Sun01] or the book of Cvitanic
and Zhang [CZ13].
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Recently, new ingredients have been introduced to the contract theory, which al-
lows us to study more general models and obtain tractable solutions. Sannikov
studied in [San08] a model in which the Principal provides continuous payments
to the Agent and chooses a random retiring time. As a remarkable contribu-
tion of the paper, Sannikov observed that the value of the Agent’s problem (the
continuation utility) should be considered as a state variable for the problem of
the Principal. Later, Cvitanic´, Possamaï and Touzi proposed in [CPT14, CPT15]
a very general procedure to solve Principal/Agent problems with lump-sum
payments in which the Agent can control both the drift and the volatility of
the output. They observe that as an utility maximization problem, the Agent’s
problem can be reduced2 to solving a backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE) introduced in Pardoux and Peng [PP90] (see also El Karoui, Peng and
Quenez [EKPQ97]), or its fully-nonlinear generalization, namely second-order
BSDE (2BSDE) introduced in Soner, Touzi and Zhang [STZ12]. The problem of
the Principal, given the best reaction of the Agent, is thus a standard stochas-
tic controlled problem with the two state variables: the output process and the
continuation utility of the Agent, as Sannikov suggested.
Extensions of the Hölmstrom and Milgrom problem are nevertheless not re-
stricted to the single Principal/single Agent model. It was extended to the single
Principal/multi-Agents model by Koo, Shim and Sung in [KKSS08] then by Elie
and Possamaï in [EP16]. In these works, the Agents aim at finding a Nash equi-
librium given contracts proposed by the Principal. Elie and Possamaï proved
that the Nash equilibrium among the Agents can be characterized as the solu-
tion to a multi-dimensional BSDE, and that the problem of the Principal can be
reduced to solving a stochastic control problem which takes the continuation
utilities of all the Agents as state variables. Elie and Possamaï, in particular,
studied a single Principal/2-Agents example in which the agents compete with
each other. It is curious to see in the example that the less ambitious agent may
make less effort and leave the job to the other agent. Recently, it was studied
in [Mas17] that a Planner aims at acting for the welfare of the agents by finding
Pareto optima, and the result is compared with that in [EP16] in which the agents
reach Nash equilibria. In particular, the sufficient and necessary conditions are
provided in [Mas17] so that the Pareto optima coincide with the Nash equilibria
or that the Planner can have a higher return than in the classical multi-agents
second best case.
In this paper, we focus on a multi-Principals/single Agent problem in the con-
tinuous setting. More precisely, we assume in this paper that several Principals
aim at hiring one common agent who works simultaneously for all the Princi-
pals. This common agency problem echoes the example of the beekeeper and
2We refer to the works of El Karoui and Rouge [REK00] andHu, Imkeller andMüller [HIM+05].
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crop-owners presented above, and as far as we know, it has not been studied
in the continuous setting. Nevertheless, in the discrete case, there are several
works having investigated this problem. In the 80’s, Baron in [Bar85] studied
a common agency problem involving regulators facing non-localized external-
ities. He illustrated his study with the example of the Environemental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and the public utility commission for the control of a non-
localized pollution externality. Each entity has its own goal in preventing risks,
so the conflicting interests can appear and a cooperation between the regulators
does not hold. Baron thus implements cooperative and non-cooperative equi-
librium in his particular regulation model. Another interesting application of
common agency problem was shown in Braverman and Stiglitz [BS82], dealing
with the sharecropping of the farmers and landlords. Later, Bernheim andWhin-
ston (see [BW85, BW86]) proposed a general approach for analysing the problem
with common agency. They provided a sufficient and necessary condition which
characterizes the equilibrium, and proved that a non-cooperative equilibrium
between the Principals is efficient (that is, it attains the classical second best level
of effort and outcome) only for the first best level of effort. Dixit, Grossman and
Helpman have then extended in [DGH97] the works of Bernheim and Whinston
to more general cases, by considering non-quasilinear utility functions and by
characterizing equilibria for the general common agency problem in terms of
Nash equilibria. They also discussed the efficiency in the Pareto sense.
As mentioned above, all the previous works studied the common agency prob-
lem in the discrete time model. As far as we know, this topic has not been ex-
plored yet with a diffusion model in the continuous time setting, while such
setting-up apparently simplifies the technical argument and produces tractable
solutions (as demonstrated in [San08, CPT14, CPT15]). Our work can be treated
as an extension of the works of Bernheim andWhinston and that of Dixit, Gross-
man and Helpman in this direction, and we also try to characterize the Nash
equilibria among the contracts. Our study remains part of the analysis of Nash
equilibrium with asymmetry of information (see for instance [ÇD16]), by show-
ing that the problems of each Principal to find such equilibrium is reduced to
find a solution to a fully coupled HJB equation. This relation was well investi-
gated in the books [Car16, DJLS00] and was also applied by Carmona and Yang
to a predator trading with looser time constraints in [CY11]. Here, we register
our model in the continuation of all the mentioned works by assuming that each
Principal is rational and aims at finding his best reaction remuneration facing to
the actions of other Principals which naturally leads to the investigation of Nash
equilibria.
The general structure of our paper is the following, in Section 2 we state the com-
mon agency model that we study. In particular, we introduce the definition of
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equilibrium. We then solve the problem of the common agent in Section 3 by
using a verification result. At the heart of this work, we propose in Section 4
a general procedure to solve the common agency problem of the Principals, by
providing a characterization of the Nash equilibria in a particular set of contracts
and by deriving the corresponding fully coupled system of HJB equations. We
prove in particular that when the Principals are risk-neutral, we can find a solu-
tion to the corresponding system by considering the solution of the problem in
which the Principals are aggregated into a unique Principal. As an application
of our work, we study in Section 5 a model with two Principals hiring a common
Agent by comparing a competitive model in which the Principals are not coop-
erative to a situation in which the offers of the principals are aggregated and the
aggregated offer fits the classical bilateral Principal/Agent model. All along this
study, we try to give economical interpretations of our mathematical model and
results.
Finally, by going beyond the example of beekeepers remunerated by crop-owners
introduced at the beginning, this paper could be a good starting point to treat the
applications such as government management in which different level of a same
Minister compensated a firm, to recall the example in [BW85] or foreign borrow-
ing issues as those exposed in the work of Tirole [Tir03].
Notations. Thorough this paper, T > 0 is the maturity of the contract and is
assumed to be fixed. Let N be a positive integer. We denote by | · | the absolute
value and ‖ · ‖ the norm in RN to simplify the notations. We identify RN,N with
the space of real square matrices with sizeN , endowedwith the Euclidean norm
onRN,N . LetM be inRN,N , 1 ≤ j ≤ N and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ N , we denote byM j,: ∈ R1×N
(resp. M :,ℓ ∈ RN,1) its j-th row (resp. its ℓ-th column). We set M⊤ ∈ RN,N the
transpose ofM . We also identify RN with R1,N and for any element x of RN , we
denote by xi its ith component and x(−i) an RN−1 dimensional vector such that
x(−i) := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN )⊤.
Let G : b ∈ RN 7−→ G(b) ∈ R, we denote by ∇bG(b) ∈ RN the gradient of G.
When G is multivariate and when there is no ambiguity on the notations, ∇bG
denotes the gradient of G with respect to the vector b. When N = 1 we simply
write ∂yv as the derivative of any function v with respect to the real variable
y. Assume that a real function u is multivariate with x ∈ RN and y ∈ R, we
denote by ∂2y,yu the second derivative of u, ∇
2
xu the Jacobian matrix with size
N × N of u with respect to x and ∂2x,yu the R
N,N -valued diagonal matrix of the
derivatives of uwith respect to y and x. We denote by C1,2,2([0, T ]×RN ×R) the
space of functions continuously differentiable in time and twice continuously
differentiable functions with respect to their space variables, and we simply the
notation by writing C1,2,2 when there is no ambiguity on the underlying spaces.
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2 The multi-Principal/Agent model
In this paper we consider the Principals-Agent problem in which N Principals
hire an Agent in order to manage N risky projects. In this model, we assume
that the projects are possibly correlated among each others and the action of the
hired Agent impacts on every project. This section introduces the mathematical
model of the problem. We first define the dynamics of the N projects, and then
set the utility maximization problems of both the Agent and the Principals as a
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Let Ω := C([0, T ],RN ) be the canonical space, and X be the canonical process.
In our model, the process X describes the outputs of all N projects. Let F be
the canonical filtration, for any finite dimensional normed space (E, ‖·‖E), P(E)
(resp. Pr(E)) will denote the set of E−valued, F−adapted integrable processes
(resp. F−predictable processes).
Let P be the set of all probability measures on Ω. In the paper, we consider the
models onX in the following form:
(ν,Pν) such that ν is F-progressive, Pν ∈ P and
Xt = x+
∫ t
0 b(s,Xs, νs)ds+
∫ t
0 ΣsdW
P
ν
s , P
ν-a.s. (2.1)
where
• x ∈ RN is the initial value of the output;
• the drift function b : [0, T ]×RN ×RN −→ RN is of components denoted by
bi, i.e. b(t, x, ν) = (bi(t, x, νi))⊤1≤i≤N ;
• Σ is F-progressively measurable process taking values in RN,N , character-
izing the correlation of noise among the different projects;
• W P
ν
is a Pν-Brownian motion.
The process ν is regarded as the effort of the Agent, and influences the outputX
through the drift function b. More exactly, we set the following assumptions on
the drift and the volatility of the output process.
Assumption 2.1. Σ is bounded and for any t ∈ [0, T ], the matrix Σt is invertible with
bounded inverse. The drift function b(t,Xt, ν) is F-progressive for each ν ∈ R
N . For
any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × RN , the map ν ∈ RN 7→ bi(t, x, νi)
is continuously differentiable and there exists a positive constant C such that for any
(t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]× RN × RN
|bi(t, x, νi)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖+ |νi|), ‖∇νb(t, x, ν)‖ ≤ C.
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For technical reasons, we constrain our analysis on the following admissible ef-
fort:
Definition 2.2 (admissible effort). We denote byA the set of admissible efforts (ν,Pν)
such that
(2.1) holds true, ν takes values in A ⊂ Rn so that:
(Mνt )t∈[0,T ] :=
(
E
(∫ t
0
b(s,Xs, νs) · Σ
−1
s dW
P
ν
s
))
t∈[0,T ]
is an F-martingale,
where E denotes the Doléans-Dade exponential.
Since Mν is an F-martingale for each admissible effort, {Pν}ν are all equivalent
measures. More precisely, we have
dPν
dP
= MνT , where P := P0 ◦
(
x+
∫ ·
0
ΣsdXs
)−1
(2.2)
and P0 is the Wiener’s measure.
In our model, the Agent derives a utility given the salaries from the N Princi-
pals at the terminal time T , and his effort diminishes his general payoff through
the cost function c : [0, T ] × RN × RN 7−→ R+. More precisely, each Principal,
e.g. Principal i, proposes to the Agent a contract with the salary denoted by ξi,
a R-valued FT -measurable random variable. The total salary for the Agent is
thus ξ · 1N , where ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN )⊤ and 1N denotes the N -dimensional vec-
tor (1, . . . , 1)⊤, living in some space CN of admissible contracts defined below.
We consider the exponential utility for the Agent with risk aversion parameter
RA > 0, so that the utility of the Agent at time t = 0 given a set of salary ξ and
an admissible effort (ν,Pν) ∈ A is
uA0 (ξ, ν) := E
P
ν
[
− exp
(
−RA
(
ξ · 1N −
∫ T
0
c(t,Xt, νt)dt
))]
.
Assumption 2.3. The cost function c(t,Xt, ν) is F-progressive for each ν ∈ R
N . For
any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × RN , the map ν 7−→ c(t, x, ν) is continuously differentiable, in-
creasing and convex. There exist 0 < κ < κ and (m,m) ∈ [1,+∞) × (0,m] such
that
0 ≤ c(t, x, ν) ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖ν‖1+m),
κ‖ν‖m ≤ ‖∇νc(t, x, ν)‖ ≤ κ
(
1 + ‖ν‖m
)
and lim‖ν‖→+∞
c(t, x, ν)
‖ν‖
= +∞.
The cost function c depends obviously on the effort of the Agent and the fact that
c is increasing in it emphasizes that making a bigger effort leads to a bigger cost
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for the Agent. The convexity assumption can be seen as an exhaustion effect, i.e.
higher is the work of the Agent, higher is his sensitivity to increase or decrease
his effort. The cost c can also depends on the outcome itself. For instance, if
the value of the outcome is low, the Agent could be somehow depressed and his
action could be directly impacted by it.
The Agent tries to maximize his utility given a panel of salaries ξ, by choosing
an admissible effort. Therefore, given a panel of contracts ξ proposed by the N
Principals, the weak formulation of the Agent’s problem is
UA0 (ξ) := sup
(ν,Pν)∈A
uA0 (ξ, ν). (2.3)
Denote by A⋆(ξ) the set of best responses of the Agent, given a vector of salaries
ξ. Given the best response, we will study Nash equilibriums among the N -
Principals when they try to maximize their own utilities.
Consider an Agent with a reservation utility R0 ∈ R, that is, the N -Principals
have to solve their utility maximization problem under the constraint that the
set of contracts ξ proposed to the Agent satisfies
UA0 (ξ) ≥ R0. (2.4)
Otherwise, the Agent may refuse to work for them. Now we introduce the
problem of the ith Principal. Assume that her payoff is given by a function
UP i : R −→ R increasing and concave. The problem of Principal i is
UPi0 := sup
ξi∈Ci:UA0 (ξ)≥R0
sup
ν⋆∈A⋆(ξ)
E
ν⋆
[
KT0 UPi(ℓi(XT )− ξ
i)
]
, (2.5)
where
• KT0 := e
−
∫ T
0
krdr is the discounting process with a bounded process k;
• ℓi : R
N −→ R is a liquidation function of linear growth;
• Ci is the set of admissible contract which will be defined later (see (4.8)).
Remark 2.4. Our definition of the Principal’s problem follows the one in [CPT15]. As
in the classic literature (see e.g. [San08, CPT14, CPT15]), we will use a semimartingale
representation of the contract ξ to transfer the Principal’s problem to a standard stochas-
tic control problem. After this transformation, we shall see that the maximization over
ν⋆ ∈ A⋆(ξ) does not change the structure of the problem. Therefore, for the simplicity of
notations, we assume in the rest of the paper that A⋆(ξ) is a singleton, and the problem
of Principal i can read as
UPi0 := sup
ξi∈C:UA0 (ξ)≥R0
E
ν⋆(ξ)
[
KT0 UPi(ℓi(XT )− ξ
i)
]
.
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We can provide two interesting examples which have been investigated in the
discrete case by [BW85].
Competitive Principals. If one considers now that the ith Principal receives XiT at
time T and possibly gets a higher utility if her project is higher than the empirical mean
of the others, we have
ℓi(x) = x
i + γi
xi − 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
xj
 , x ∈ RN ,
where γi ≥ 0 is typically her appetence parameter toward project i. This situation fits
exactly with noncooperative Principals’ behaviors investigated in [BW85]. We refer to
Sections 5.3 for an example of the impact of the different parameters in this situation.
Aggregated offer. If one considers now that one can aggregate theN -Principals, then
we reduce this problem to a single Principal-Agent model in the classical second-best case
in which each ith component of the output has an efficiency parameter γi compared to the
other components. In this case, the payoff of the aggregated Principal, called the parent
firm is
N∑
i=1
XiT
1 + γi − 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
γj
− ξ
where ξ is the aggregation of the N salaries. This case coincides with the cooperative
model of Section 2 in [BW85], and it will be studied more deeply in Section 5.2.
We finish this section, by introducing the Nash equilibrium among theN Princi-
pals.
Definition 2.5 (Nash equilibrium). A contract ξ⋆ ∈ CN is a Nash equilibrium for the
N Principals if it satisfies
sup
ξi∈Ci
E
ν⋆(ξ⋆)
[
KT0 UPi
(
ℓi(XT )− ξ
i
)]
= Eν
⋆(ξ⋆)
[
KT0 UPi
(
ℓi(XT )− ξ
i,⋆
)]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
with UA0 (ξ
⋆) ≥ R0.
3 Solving the Agent problem
The essential idea in [San08, CPT14, CPT15] is to study the contracts with a (for-
ward) semimartingale representation. The representation, on the one hand, can
10
help solve the Agent problem through simple verification argument. On the
other hand, it reduces the Principal problem to standard stochastic control prob-
lem. In our study, we shall borrow this idea. However, instead of representing
every contract ξi, we only use the semimartingale representation of the sum of
the salaries ξ · 1N .
First, let us recall the definition of BMO space.
Definition 3.1. For any process Z ∈ H2 := {Z ∈ Pr(R
N ) : EP[
∫ T
0 ‖Zt‖
2dt] < ∞}
(recall P defined in (2.2)), we say that Z ∈ H2BMO, if there exists a non negative constant
C such that for any t ≤ T we have
E
P
t
[∫ T
t
‖Zs‖
2ds
]
≤ C2.
In the rest of paper, we constrain our study on the following type of set of con-
tracts:
CN :=
{
ξ : UA0 (ξ) ≥ R0 and there is Y0 ∈ R
N and Z ∈ H2BMO such that
ξ · 1N = Y0 +
∫ T
0
G(t,Xt, Zt)dt+
∫ T
0
Zt · dXt, P-a.s.
}
, (3.6)
where G(s, x, z) := RA2 ‖Σ
⊤
s z‖
2 − supν∈A
(
b(t, x, ν) · z − c(t, x, ν)
)
. By recalling
Remark 2.4, we assume here that argmaxν
(
b(t, x, ν) · z − c(t, x, ν)
)
is a singleton
for each (t, x, z) and denote
ν⋆t (x, z) := argmax
ν
(
b(t, x, ν) · z − c(t, x, ν)
)
. (3.7)
Lemma 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 be true. Then
‖ν⋆t (x, z)‖ ≤ C
(
1 + ‖z‖
1
m
)
and |G(t, x, z)| ≤ C
(
1 + ‖z‖2 + ‖z‖‖x‖
)
.
Proof. The proof follows the same line that the proofs of [EP16] or [EMP16].
Remark 3.3. Thanks to the work on the backward SDE with quadratic growth, we know
that the set CN is quite large. In fact, provided that the BSDE with terminal value ξ and
generator G has a solution (Y,Z) with Z in the BMO space, and that UA0 (ξ) ≥ R0, then
ξ belongs to CN . For example, due to [Kob00], it is well-known that all bounded ξ such
that UA0 (ξ) ≥ R0 belong to CN .
The following proposition reveals the optimal effort of the Agent.
Proposition 3.4. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 be true. For ξ ∈ CN , if (ν
∗,Pν
∗
) ∈ A
where ν∗t := ν
⋆
t (Xt, Zt), then we have
UA0 (ξ) = −e
−RAY0 and ν∗t is the optimal effort of the Agent.
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Proof. Note that P and Pν are equivalent measures for all admissible efforts. Us-
ing the semimartingale representation of ξ · 1N , we have for admissible ν that
uA0 (ξ, ν) = E
P
ν
[
− exp
(
−RA
(
ξ · 1N −
∫ T
0
c(t,Xt, νt)dt
))]
= EP
ν
[
− exp
(
−RA
(
Y0 +
∫ T
0
(
G(t,Xt, Zt)− c(t,Xt, νt)
)
dt+
∫ T
0
Zt · dXt
))]
≤ EP
ν
[
− exp
(
−RA
(
Y0 +
∫ T
0
(RA
2
‖Σ⊤t Zt‖
2 − b(t,Xt, νt) · Zt
)
dt+
∫ T
t
Zt · dXt
))]
= EP
ν
[
− exp
(
−RA
(
Y0 +
∫ T
0
RA
2
‖Σ⊤t Zt‖
2dt+
∫ T
t
Zt · ΣdW
P
ν
t
))]
= −e−RAY0 .
The last equality is due to the fact that Z ∈ H2BMO, and the inequality is an
equality if νt = ν∗t (Xt, Zt).
Remark 3.5. One sufficient condition for (ν∗,Pν
∗
) ∈ A can be m ≥ 1, so that ν∗ ∈
H
2
BMO and thus (ν
∗,Pν
∗
) ∈ A.
4 Solving the Principals problem
As mentioned before, the main difficulty here is that we do not have a semi-
martingale representation for the component ξi, when solving the Agent prob-
lem. Instead, we only have a such representation for the sum of the salaries,
ξ · 1N .
In this paper, we are only interested in Nash equilibriums in the following sets
of contracts:
C˜N :=
{
ξ ∈ CN : ∃(y, α, β) ∈ R
N ×P(RN )×H2BMO(R
N,N ),
ξi = yi +
∫ T
0
αisds+
∫ T
0
β:,is · dXs, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
,
where H2BMO(R
N,N ) extends Definition 3.1 to RN,N valued process.
More intuitively speaking, we search for Nash equilibriums among the contracts
with semimartingale form. Therefore, at such a Nash equilibrium, each Principal
i should maximize her utility among the following contracts:
Ci(ξ−i) := {ξi : ξ ∈ C˜N}, (4.8)
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where ξ−i = (ξ1, · · · , ξi−1, ξi+1, · · · , ξN )⊤. Without ambiguity, we will only de-
note the set by Ci.
Note that, similarly to [BW85, (i′)], the problem of the ith Principal (2.5) can be
rewritten given the contracts ξj of the other Principals j 6= i
sup
ξi∈Ci
E
ν⋆(ξ)
KT0 UPi
ℓi(XT )− ξ · 1N +∑
j 6=i
ξj
 . (4.9)
In the following sections, we try to characterize the Nash equilibriums, guided
by the following ideas.
• The definition in (4.8) immediately leads to a condition for equilibrium.
• For each principal, the optimization (4.9) can be transformed to a standard
stochastic control problem, which leads to an HJB equation. Therefore,
we naturally obtain a system of N coupled HJB equations associated with
the problems of Principals. Using classical verification argument, we can
show that this system of HJB equations provides a Nash equilibrium for
the Principals’s problems in the class of contracts.
• In particular, if all the Principals are risk-neutral, the stochastic control
problem for each Principal is associated to a semilinear HJB equation, and
thus enjoys a better solvability.
Remark 4.1. We would like to comment and explain why this class of contract seems
to be reasonable in our model. First of all, this class of contract is non-Markovian and it
is well known that in the single Principal-Agent model, as soon as one assume that the
dynamic of the output is boosted by some parameter α, i.e. b(t, x, a) := αx + at, one
gets non-Markovian contracts. Thus, there is no reason to consider a subset of C˜N only
containing functions of XT .
The second remark is that one could think that since any contract ξi is anFT−measurable
random variable with nice integrability property, by considering Yt := E[ξ
i|Ft], we get
from the martingale representation theorem that there exists some process Z such that
ξi = E[ξi] +
∫ T
0 Zt · dWs. Thus, ξ
i can be seen as the terminal value of a stochastic
integral. However, we will show below that due to the Stackelberg game between the
Agent and the Principals, this class of contracts is not robust and does not contain a
Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 4.3 below).
Finally we would like to insist on the fact that this restriction on components ξi is allowed
for our work because our aim is to get only the existence of a Nash equilibrium. An
extension of this work could be to consider a larger class of contracts included in CN such
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that the components ξi have not necessarily the semi-martingale decomposition with
α and β and compare the two classes (in term of Pareto efficiency for instance). This
question seems however very difficult and is not at the heart of our work.
Before going further let us explain more the meaning of the class of contracts
C˜N . Any salary ξi given by the ith Principal depends on the projects of other
Principal Xj , j 6= i. We provide some interpretations of this phenomenon.
Interpretation of the model First, we can assume that the ith Principal promises
to the Agent a part of the value of her firm but also a part of the outcome of an other
Principal. Second, some externalities can appear as a network effect (see for instance
[Laf89, BS62, LM94] for more explanations with definition of this phenomenon). This
fits typically with the introductive example with the beekeeper and crop-owners, since
each crop-owner can benefit from the beehives in the other crops through the pollinisation
process. An other interpretation is to consider a parent firm and some subsidiaries (the
N Principals) who employed the same Agent. For instance and in concrete terms, this
model is quite suitable in the example of the German firm SonnenGmbH in which Agents
are connected to produce, use and share energy.
Remark 4.2. The case in which a Principal has a free-rider behaviour by proposing no
remuneration to the Agent and the other Principal compensates fully the Agent is not
an equilibrium due to the common agency framework. Indeed, as showed in Theorem 4.7
below, by taking αi,⋆ = 0, βi,⋆ is not equal to zero.
4.1 Equilibrium conditions
Proposition 4.3 (Necessary condition of Nash equilibrium). Let ξ⋆ = (ξi,⋆)1≤i≤N
be a Nash equilibrium in C˜N such that ξ
i,⋆ is characterized by the triplet (yi, αi,⋆, βi,⋆).
Then, the following equilibrium condition holds for (yi, αi,⋆, βi,⋆)1≤i≤N :
N∑
i=1
yi = Y0,
N∑
i=1
αis = G(s,Xs,
N∑
i=1
βis)
N∑
i=1
βis = Zs.
(4.10)
Proof. The result simply follows from the definition of CN (3.6) and that of Ci
(4.8).
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4.2 General case with fully-nonlinear HJB equations
We are going to fully characterize a Nash equilibrium. We start from the problem
of the ith Principal (4.9). Denote r0 := −
ln(−R0)
RA
, so that we have
UA0 (ξ) ≥ R0 ⇐⇒ Y0 ≥ r0,
thanks to Proposition 3.4. It follows from Proposition 4.3 that
UPi0 (x) = sup
ξi∈Ci
E
ν⋆
KT0 UPi
ℓi(XT )− ξ · 1N +∑
j 6=i
ξj

= sup
yi≥r0−
∑
j 6=i y
j
sup
(αi,βi)∈P(R)×H2
BMO
∑N
i=1 α
i
s=G(s,Xs,
∑N
i=1 β
i
s)
E
ν⋆
[
KT0 UPi(ℓi(XT )− Y
yi,αi,βi
T )
]
= sup
yi≥r0−
∑
j 6=i y
j
ui(0, x, yi),
= ui
(
0, x, r0 −
∑
j 6=i
yj
)
,
where
ui(0, x, yi) := sup
βi∈H2
BMO
E
ν⋆
[
KT0 UPi
(
ℓ(XT )− Y
yi,αi,βi
T
)]
, (4.11)
and
Y
yi,αi,βi
T = y
i +
∫ T
0
(
G
(
s,Xs, Sβ(−i)s
+ βis
)
− S
α
(−i)
s
)
ds+
∫ T
0
βis · dXs, (4.12)
where Sα(−i) :=
∑
j 6=i α
j and Sβ(−i) :=
∑
j 6=i β
j and with fixed (αj , βj)j 6=i.
The problem of the Principal (4.11) coincides with a stochastic control problem
with the following characteristics:
• two state variables: the outputX and the value process Y y
i,αi,βi ;
• one control variable: the coefficient βi.
It is associated with the following HJB equation :−(∂tu
i − kui)(t, x, y) − sup
βi∈RN
H(t, x, y,∇xu
i, ∂yu
i,∇2xu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i, S
α
(−i)
s
, S
β
(−i)
s
, βi) = 0,
ui(T, x, y) = UP i(ℓi(x)− y), (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× R
N × R.
(4.13)
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with Hamiltonian H defined for any (t, x, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, sa, sb, b) ∈ [0, T ] × RN ×
R
N × R× RN,N ×R× RN,N × R× RN × RN by
H(t, x, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, sa, sb, b)
:= p · b(t, x, ν⋆(x, b+ sb)) + p˜
(
G(s, x, b + sb)− sa + b · b(t, x, ν
⋆(x, b + sb))
)
+
1
2
Tr(ΣtΣ⊤t q) +
1
2
Tr(b⊤ΣtΣ⊤t bq˜) + Tr(1
⊤
NΣtΣ
⊤
t br)
Assumption 4.4 (FOC). There exists a maximizer βi,⋆ for b 7−→ H(t, x, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, sa, sb, b)
satisfying some first order condition given by the relation
λi(t, x, p, p˜, q˜, r, sb, β
i,⋆
t ) := ∇bH(t, x, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, sa, sb, b) = 0. (4.14)
Then, the problem of the ith Principal can be solved by a classical verification
theorem.
Proposition 4.5 (Verification). Let ξ ∈ C˜N and denote by (yj, αj , βj) the triplet asso-
ciated with ξj, j 6= i. Assume that there exists a solution ui to HJB equation (4.13) in
C1,2,2([0, T ]×RN×R). Then, by denoting βi,⋆s the corresponding maximizer, we deduce
that UPi0 (x) = u
i(0, x, r0 −
∑
j 6=i y
j) and the optimal contract ξi,⋆ proposed by the ith
Principal is
ξi,⋆ = r0 −
∑
j 6=i
y
j
0 +
∫ T
0
αi,⋆s ds+
∫ T
0
βi,⋆s · dXs,
with
αi,⋆s = G
s,Xs,∑
j 6=i
βjs + β
i,⋆
s
−∑
j 6=i
αjs.
Since we solve each Principal’s problem using an HJB equation, we naturally
obtain a system ofN HJB equations. Similarly to [DJLS00, Theorems 8.4 and 8.5],
one can derive from the system of equations a Nash equilibrium in the sense of
Definition 2.5.
We shall assume that there are solutions to PDEs (4.13) for all i = 1, · · · , N , which
also satisfy the equilibrium condition (4.3).
Assumption 4.6. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (t, x, y, pi, p˜i, q˜i, ri) ∈ [0, T ]×RN×R×
R
N×R×R×R there exists (αi,⋆
(
t, x, y, (pi, p˜i, q˜i, ri)1≤i≤N )
)
1≤i≤N
, βi,⋆
(
t, x, y, (pi, p˜i, q˜i, ri)1≤i≤N )
)
1≤i≤N
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such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N
λi
t, x, y, pi, p˜i, q˜i, ri,∑
j 6=i
βj,⋆, βi,⋆
 = 0,
N∑
i=1
α
i,⋆
t = G
(
t, x,
N∑
i=1
β
i,⋆
t
)
.
(4.15)
Moreover, we assume that the following system of fully coupled PDEs admits a solution
u = (ui)1≤i≤N such that u
i ∈ C1,2,2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N :L
(
t, x, y, ui,∇xu
i, ∂yu
i,∇2xu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i, Sα(−i) , Sβ(−i) , β
i,⋆
)
= ktu
i,
ui(T, x, y) = UP i(ℓi(x)− y), (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ) ×R
N ×R.
(4.16)
with L := ∂t +H ,
βi,⋆ := βi,⋆
(
t, x, y, (∇xu
i, ∂yu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i)1≤i≤N
)
Sα(−i) :=
∑
j 6=i
αj,⋆
(
t, x, y, (∇xu
i, ∂yu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i)1≤i≤N
)
and
Sβ(−i) :=
∑
j 6=i
βj,⋆
(
t, x, y, (∇xu
i, ∂yu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i)1≤i≤N
)
.
Theorem 4.7. Let Assumption 4.6 be true. Further, define for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N
ξi,⋆ = yi +
∫ T
0
αi,⋆s ds +
∫ T
0
βi,⋆s · dXs,
with
α
i,⋆
t := α
i,⋆
(
t, x, y, (∇xu
i, ∂yu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i)1≤i≤N
)
and
β
i,⋆
t := β
i,⋆
(
t, x, y, (∇xu
i, ∂yu
i, ∂2yyu
i, ∂2x,yu
i)1≤i≤N
)
.
Then, the set of contract (ξi,⋆)1≤i≤N is an admissible Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows from the same argument as [DJLS00, Theorems 8.4 and
8.5], thanks to Proposition 4.5.
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4.3 Special case for risk-neutral Principals
The main difficulty on the previous procedure of solving the Principals’ prob-
lem is to check that Assumption 4.6 holds true, i.e. there exists a solution to the
system (4.16) of fully coupled HJB equations. It is obviously a tough question
in general cases. In this section, we will show that if the Principals are all risk-
neutral and there is no discount factor, i.e.
k ≡ 0 and UP i(ℓi(x)− y) = ℓi(x)− y, (x, y) ∈ R
N × R,
the system of equations are solvable under reasonable assumptions.
Recall the value function of the ith Principal (4.11). Since k ≡ 0 and the Principal
is risk-neutral, we have
ui(0, x; yi) := sup
βi∈H2
BMO
E
ν⋆
[
ℓi(XT )− Y
yi,αi,βi
T
]
= sup
βi∈H2
BMO
E
ν⋆
[
ℓi(XT )− y
i −
∫ T
0
(
G
(
s,Xs, β¯s
)
− S
α
(−i)
s
)
ds−
∫ T
0
βis · dXs
]
,
= −yi + sup
βi∈H2
BMO
E
ν⋆
[
ℓi(XT )−
∫ T
0
(
G
(
s,Xs, β¯s
)
− S
α
(−i)
s
+ βis · b
(
s,Xs, ν
∗
s (Xs, β¯s)
))
ds
]
,
where β¯ :=
∑N
i=1 β
i. Since we are only interested in finding a particular Nash
equilibrium, we may assume
αis =
G(s,Xs, β¯s)
N
,
so that the second line of (4.15) is satisfied and the control problem above is
further simplified to be:
ui(0, x; yi) = −yi + sup
βi∈H2
BMO
E
ν⋆
[
ℓi(XT )−
∫ T
0
(
G
(
s,Xs, β¯s
)
N
+ βis · b
(
s,Xs, ν
∗
s (Xs, β¯s)
))
ds
]
.
Aswe can see, the stochastic control problemhere has no longer the state variable
Y as in the general case. Thus, we choose yi so that
∑N
i=1 y
i = r0 so that the
corresponding HJB equation is semilinear as follow:
∂tu
i +
1
2
Tr(ΣtΣ⊤t ∇
2
xu
i)
+ sup
β
{
(∇xu
i − β) · b
(
t, x, ν∗t (x, β¯t)
)
−
G(t, x, β¯t)
N
}
= 0, ui(T, x) = ℓi(x).
(4.17)
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Further, the first order condition for the supremum in (4.17) being reached reads:
β
i,⋆
t = ∇xu
i(t, x)− 1
N
Φ(t, x, β¯) (4.18)
with Φ(t, x, β¯) := M−1
β¯
(
∇β¯G(t, x, β¯t) +Nb
(
t, x, ν⋆(t, x, β¯t)
))
, (4.19)
whereMβ¯ := ∇νb(t, x, ν
⋆(t, x, β¯t))∇zν
⋆(t, x, β¯t). In order that (4.18) makes sense
and for the upcoming reasoning, we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4.8. Assume that
• ν∗ : (t, x, z) 7→ ν∗(t, x, z) is continuously differentiable in z;
• Mβ¯ is invertible for all (t, x, β¯);
• the function Id + Φ(t, x, ·) is invertible, and its inverse function is denoted by
ϕ(t, x, ·).
Further, define
H(t, x, z) :=
(
z − ϕ(t, x, z)
)
· b
(
t, x, ν∗(t, x, ϕ(t, x, z))
)
−G
(
t, x, ϕ(t, x, z)
)
, (4.20)
and assume that
• for some γ, α ∈ (0, 1), L : x 7→
∑N
i=1 ℓi(x) ∈ Hγ(R
N ) (the Hölder space),
ΣtΣ
⊤
t ∈ H1([0, T ]) andH ∈ Hα(K) for any bounded subset of [0, T ]×R
N×RN ;
• H(t, x, z) = O(|z|2) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × RN .
Remark 4.9. The first part of Assumption 4.8 is structural in our approach, while the
second part is a sufficient condition for the solvability of the PDEwe will encounter in the
following argument. The readers may find alternative conditions in different contexts.
Theorem 4.10. Let Assumption 2.1, 2.3 and 4.8 hold true. Then, the system of equa-
tions composed of the equations as (4.17), for all i = 1, · · · , N , admits a classical solu-
tion.
Remark 4.11. The main idea of proving the result above is to study the ‘aggregated’
equation. Let us do the following intuitive analysis. Summing up the equations (4.18)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we formally have
β¯ = ∇xV − Φ(·, β¯),
where V =
∑N
i=1 u
i, and thus β¯ = ϕ(·,∇xV ). Using the optimal β
i,⋆ in (4.18), we can
rewrite (4.17) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N as
∂tu
i +
1
2
Tr(ΣtΣ
⊤
t ∇
2
xu
i)
+ (∇xu
i − βi,⋆t ) · b
(
t, x, ν∗t (x, β¯t)
)
−
G(t, x, β¯t)
N
= 0, ui(T, x) = ℓi(x). (4.21)
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Sum up the N equations, and we obtain the so-called ‘aggregated’ equation:∂tV +
1
2
Tr
(
ΣtΣ
⊤
t ∇
2
xV
)
+H(·,∇xV ) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R
N ,
V (T, x) = L(x),
(4.22)
where H is defined in (4.20). Under Assumption 4.8, the equation above admits a solu-
tion V ∈ H
(−1−γ)
2+α (see e.g. Theorem 12.16, pp. 315, [Lie96]). Note that (4.22) does not
necessarily have an unique solution, but it does not bother the following argument.
Proof of Theorem 4.10 In this proof, we shall construct a solution to the system
of equations, using one solution V to (4.22). Note that we have the following
representation for V :
V (t, x) = EP
[
L(XT ) +
∫ T
t
H
(
s,Xs,∇xV (s,Xs)
)
ds
∣∣Xt = x]. (4.23)
Now define for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
∂tu˜
i +
1
2
Tr(ΣtΣ⊤t ∇
2
xu˜
i) +
1
N
H(·,∇xV ) = 0, u˜
i(T, x) = ℓi(x).
The equation above is a heat equation, so it admits a classical solution and
u˜i(t, x) = EP
[
ℓi(XT ) +
∫ T
t
1
N
H(s,Xs,∇xV (s,Xs))ds
∣∣Xt = x].
Together with (4.23), it is clear that V =
∑N
i=1 u˜
i and thus
∇xV =
N∑
i=1
∇xu˜
i. (4.24)
Now define
β¯ := ϕ(·,∇xV ), β
i := ∇xu˜
i −
1
N
Φ(·, β¯). (4.25)
It follows from (4.24) that β¯ =
∑N
i=1 β
i. Also note that
1
N
H(·,∇xV ) =
1
N
Φ(·, ϕ(·,∇xV )) · b
(
·, ν∗(·, ϕ(·,∇xV ))
)
−
G(t, x, ϕ(·,∇xV ))
N
=
(
∇xu˜
i − βi
)
· b
(
·, ν∗(·, β¯)
)
−
G(t, x, β¯)
N
.
Therefore u˜i is a solution to (4.21). Together with (4.25), we conclude that u˜i is a
classical solution to (4.17).
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5 Application to a model with two correlated Principals
with appetence parameters
5.1 The bi-Principals model
Let ν := (ν1, ν2)⊤ an admissible effort. Let W be a 2-dimensional Brownian
motion and Σ ∈ R2,2 be an invertible matrix. We assume that
• there is no discount factor, i.e. k = 0.
• both Principals are risk-neutral, that is, UP 1 = UP 2 = I , the identity func-
tion.
• the drift b is a linear function of the effort such that b(t, x, ν) := Kν, where
K is a diagonal matrix with coefficients k1, k2 on the diagonal which repre-
sents the efficiency of the Agent with project 1 and 2.
• the map c is the classical quadratic cost function defined by c(t, x, ν) =
‖νt‖2
2 .
• ℓi(x) := (1 + γi)xi − γixj , 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2 with appetence parameters
γ1, γ2 ∈ [0, 1], and denote Γ := (1 + γ1 − γ2, 1 + γ2 − γ1)⊤.
Clearly, this model is an example of the special case we discussed in Section 4.3.
It follows from (3.7) that we have the following relation between the optimal
effort of the Agent and the volatility coefficients of the contracts:
ν⋆ = K(β1 + β2).
Further, it follows from (4.11) and (4.12) that the value functions read:
UPi0 (x) = sup
βi
E
ν⋆
[
ℓ(XT )−
∫ T
0
(RA
2
‖Σ⊤(β1s+β
2
s )‖
2−
‖K(β1s + β
2
s )‖
2
2
−S
α
(−i)
s
+K2(β1s+β
2
s )·β
i
s
)
ds
]
.
We have the following corollary from Theorem 4.10.
Corollary 5.1. There exist (α1,⋆, β1,⋆) and (α2,⋆, β2,⋆) such that the following system
of PDEs admits a solution (v1, v2) in C1,2([0, T ]× R2)
−∂tv
1(t, x)−
{
∇xv
1 ·K2(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t ) +
1
2
Tr
(
ΣΣ⊤∇2xv
1
)
−
RA
2
‖Σ⊤(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t )‖
2
+
‖K(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t )‖
2
2
+ α2,⋆t −K
2(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t ) · β
1,⋆
t
}
= 0
v1(T, x) = (1 + γ1)x1 − γ1x2,
(5.26)
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and
−∂tv
2(t, x)−
{
∇xv
2 ·K2(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t ) +
1
2
Tr
(
ΣΣ⊤∇2xv
2
)
−
RA
2
‖Σ⊤(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t )‖
2
+
‖K(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t )‖
2
2
+ α1,⋆t −K
2(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t ) · β
2,⋆
t
}
= 0
v2(T, x) = (1 + γ2)x2 − γ2x1,
(5.27)
and that the first order conditions (4.15) hold true, that is,
β1,⋆ = ∇xv
1 −K−2RAΣΣ
⊤(β1,⋆ + β2,⋆)
β2,⋆ = ∇xv
2 −K−2RAΣΣ
⊤(β1,⋆ + β2,⋆)
α1,⋆ + α2,⋆ = RA2 ‖Σ
⊤(β1,⋆t + β
2,⋆
t )‖
2 −
K2‖β1,⋆t +β
2,⋆
t ‖
2
2 .
(5.28)
In the rest of this section, we are going to compute the explicit solutions to the
system of equations (5.26), (5.27). We learn from (5.28) that the function Φ as
(4.19) in this case is:
Φ(β) = 2K−2RAΣΣ
⊤β.
Further, we have
ϕ(β) = (Id+Φ)−1(β) =
(
I + 2K−2RAΣΣ
⊤
)−1
β =: Mβ
Therefore, the ‘aggregated equation’ in this case reads:−∂tV (t, x)−
1
2
Tr
(
ΣΣ⊤∇2xV
)
−∇xV ·K
2M∇xV +
RA
2
‖Σ⊤M∇xV ‖
2 +
‖KM∇xV ‖
2
2
= 0
V (T, x) = x · Γ,
(5.29)
It is easy to observe that PDE (5.29) has the unique smooth solution
V (t, x) = x · Γ + λ(T − t), (5.30)
with λ = Γ ·K2MΓ− RA2 ‖Σ
⊤MΓ‖2 − ‖KMΓ‖
2
2 .
In particular, ∇xV = Γ, and thus
β1,⋆ + β2,⋆ = ϕ(∇xV ) = MΓ and ν∗ = KMΓ. (5.31)
Together with the first order condition (5.28), we have{
β1,⋆ = ∇xv
1 −K−2RAΣΣ
⊤MΓ,
β2,⋆ = ∇xv
2 −K−2RAΣΣ
⊤MΓ.
(5.32)
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Therefore, assuming α1,⋆ = α2,⋆, we know that the solution to the equation (5.26)
satisfies:−∂tv1(t, x)−
1
2
Tr
(
ΣΣ⊤∇2xv
1
)
−
1
2
Γ ·K2MΓ +
RA
4
‖Σ⊤MΓ‖2 +
‖KMΓ‖2
4
= 0
v1(T, x) = (1 + γ1)x1 − γ1x2,
It is easy to compute the explicit solution to the equation above:
v1(t, x) := λ˜(T − t) + (1 + γ1,−γ1)x
with λ˜ := Γ ·K2MΓ− 5RA4 ‖Σ
⊤MΓ‖2 − 34‖KMΓ‖
2.
Similarly, we compute the solution to the equation (5.27) as
v2(t, x) := λ˜(T − t) + (−γ2, 1 + γ2)x.
5.2 Comparison with the model with the aggregated offer
In this section, we compare the competitive common agency example studied
in the previous section with the model in which the Principals can be aggre-
gated, that is, the problem can be reduced to one single Principal-Agent model
as mentioned at the end of Section 2. In this case, the Agent problem can be
solved by considering the same class of contracts, that is, there exists (Y0, Z) ∈
[R0,+∞)×H
2
BMO(R
2) such that
ξ = Y0 +
∫ T
0
Zs · ΣdWs +
∫ T
0
(
RA
2
‖Σ⊤Zs‖
2 +
‖KZs‖
2
2
−KZs · Zs
)
ds
= Y0 +
∫ T
0
Zs · ΣdW
⋆
s +
∫ T
0
(
RA
2
‖Σ⊤Zs‖
2 +
‖KZs‖
2
2
)
ds,
whereW ⋆ is a Pν
⋆
-Brownian motion. The Principal manages to do the following
optimization:
U0 = sup
Z
E
⋆
[
(1 + γ1 − γ2)X
1
T + (1 + γ2 − γ1)X
2
T − ξ
]
As before, we can calculate the optimal control:
Z⋆ = MaΓ, with Ma :=
(
RAΣΣ
⊤ +K2
)−1
K2.
Further, the optimal effort of the Agent should be
ν⋆Pf = KMaΓ.
By comparing ν⋆Pf and ν
⋆ in (5.31), we immediately have the following conclu-
sion.
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Proposition 5.2. The effort of the common Agent in the competitive model coincides
with the effort of the common Agent in the aggregated model if and only if the Agent is
risk-neutral, that is, RA = 0.
Link with the results of [BW86] for the discrete-case model. Recall that if the
Agent is risk-neutral, it is well-known that in the single Principal-Agent problem,
the effort in the first best case coincides with that in the second best case (see for
instance [LM09, Proposition 4.1]). Indeed, as an extension of it in our particular
model, if one computes the first best effort, one has to solve
UFB0 = sup
ν, ξ
E
ν
[
XT · Γ− ξ · 12 − ρe
−RA(ξ·12−
∫ T
0
‖νs‖
2
2
ds)
]
,
with a Lagrange multiplier ρ > 0 ensuring that the Agent receives his utility
reservation R0 < 0. In this case, by using Gâteaux derivative to characterize
the optimal ξ (see for instance the method used in [EP16]) one gets after an easy
computation the following optimizers
ν
⋆,FB
t := KΓ,
ξ⋆ · 12 = KΓ−
1
RA
log (−R0) .
Therefore, we have proved that the ’second best’ effort of a risk-neutral Agent
in the competitive model coincides with the ’first best’ effort. This is exactly an
extension of the result in [BW86] in the discrete-case.
Comparison of optimal remunerations. In the common agencymodelwe have
seen that the remuneration given to the Agent is
ξ⋆1 + ξ
⋆
2 = R0 + T
(
RA
2
‖Σ⊤MΓ‖2 +
‖KMΓ‖2
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:δ
+
∫ T
0
MΓ · ΣdW ⋆s .
In the aggregated model, we recall that
ξ⋆ := R0 + T
(
RA
2
‖Σ⊤MaΓ‖
2 +
‖KMaΓ‖
2
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:δa
+
∫ T
0
MaΓ · ΣdW
⋆
s
Let Σ := I2, then, we get
M =
 k212RA+k21 0
0
k22
2RA+k
2
2

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and
Ma =
 k21RA+k21 0
0
k22
RA+k22

In this particular model, we have δa ≥ δ, i.e. the non-risk part of the remu-
neration is higher for the Agent if he is employed by the aggregated firm (the
parent firm), comparing to the case he is hired by two different firms. This is
curious, because intuitively the Agent should receive higher return if the firms
compete with each other. However, one must note that the Agent works more
(‖ν⋆Pf‖1 ≥ ‖ν
⋆‖1) in the aggregated model which could explained this effect.
5.3 Impact of the appetence, efficiency and correlation parameters
Let ρ ∈ [−1, 1] be a correlation parameter such that
Σ :=
(
1 0
ρ
√
1− ρ2
)
, K :=
(
k1 0
0 k2
)
In this case, we get after a (tedious but easy) computation
ν1,⋆ =
2RAk1
(
(1 + γ2 − γ1)k
2
2ρ− (1 + γ1 − γ2)k
2
1
)
− k31k
2
2(1 + γ1 − γ2)
2R2A(ρ
2 − 1)− 2RA(k21 + k
2
2)− k
2
1k
2
2
ν2,⋆ =
2RAk2
(
(1 + γ1 − γ2)k
2
1ρ− (1 + γ2 − γ1)k
2
2
)
− k21k
3
2(1 + γ2 − γ1)
2R2A(ρ
2 − 1)− 2RA(k
2
1 + k
2
2)− k
2
1k
2
2
Impact of the correlation and the appetence parameters. Assume that k :=
k1 = k2. In this case
ν1,⋆(ρ) :=
2RAk
3 ((1 + γ2 − γ1)ρ− (1 + γ1 − γ2))− k
5(1 + γ1 − γ2)
2R2A(ρ
2 − 1)− 4RAk2 − k4
ν2,⋆(ρ) :=
2RAk
3 ((1 + γ1 − γ2)ρ− (1 + γ2 − γ1))− k
5(1 + γ2 − γ1)
2R2A(ρ
2 − 1)− 4RAk2 − k4
Note that
ν1,⋆(ρ)− ν2,⋆(ρ) =
4RAk
3 ((γ2 − γ1)(ρ+ 1)) − 2k
5(γ1 − γ2)
2R2A(ρ
2 − 1)− 4RAk2 − k4
= (γ1 − γ2)
−4RAk
3(ρ+ 1)− 2k5
2R2A(ρ
2 − 1)− 4RAk2 − k4
.
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Thus as soon as γ1 > γ2, we get ν1,⋆(ρ) > ν2,⋆(ρ) so that the Agent works more
for the more ambitious principal. Moreover, we have
d(ρ) :=
ν1,⋆
ν⋆
(ρ)−
ν2,⋆
ν⋆
(ρ) = (γ1 − γ2)
2RAk
3(1 + ρ) + k5
2RAk3(1− ρ) + k5
,
with ν⋆ := ν1,⋆ + ν2,⋆.
By noticing that the function ρ ∈ [−1, 1) 7−→ d(ρ) is convex and increasing, we
deduce that the difference between the proportion of effort given by the Agent
with the more ambitious principal and the proportion of effort given by the
Agent with the less ambitious principal increases with the parameter ρ. In other
words, the more the projects are correlated, the more the proportion of effort
given by the Agent is impacted by the difference of the ambition parameters of
each Principal. Besides, the convexity shows that the sensibility of the propor-
tion of work given by the Agent for each principal increases with the correlation
parameter. The more the projects are correlated, the more a little variation of the
correlation has a big effect on the difference of proportion of effort given by the
Agent. We package these economical results in the following proposition
Proposition 5.3. The following stylized facts has been proved
• The non-risk part of the remuneration is higher for the Agent if he is employed
by the aggregated firm (the parent firm), comparing to the case he is hired by two
different firms.
• Trivially, by considering equals performance parameters ki, the Agent works more
for the more ambitious Principal.
• The more the projects are correlated, the more the proportion of effort given by the
Agent is impacted by the difference of the ambition parameters of each Principal.
Moreover, the sensibility of the proportion of work given by the Agent for each
principal increases with the correlation parameter.
Risk-Neutral Agent. Assume that Σ = Id2, RA = 0. In this case,M = Id2 and
ν⋆ = KΓ. In other words we have
ν1,⋆ = k1(1 + γ1 − γ2)
ν2,⋆ = k2(1 + γ2 − γ1).
The Agent works more for the Principal 1 if and only if
k1(1 + γ1 − γ2) > k2(1 + γ2 − γ1). (5.33)
Let now x := γ2 − γ1.
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• First, we note some intuitive results. If the two Principals have the same
ambition parameters, (i.e. γ1 = γ2), the Agent prefers working with the
Principal with whom he is more efficient. Similarly, if the two Principals
have the efficiency parameters, (i.e. k1 = k2), the Agent works more for the
more ambitious Principal.
• Assume now for instance that γ1 = 0, γ2 = 1. Then condition (5.33) is
never satisfies and the Agent does not work for Principal 1 whatever is
her performance. It means that the Agent does not work for the Principal
indifferent to the competition, while the other Principal is very competitive.
• Assume now that γ1 ∈ [0, 1] and γ2 ∈ [0, 1). Denote x := γ2 − γ1 ∈ [−1, 1).
The domain x ≤ 0 coincides with the situation where the Principal 1 is
more ambitious that the Principal 2 (and conversely, Principal 1 is less am-
bitious than Principal 2when x ≥ 0). Condition (5.33) can be rewritten
k1
k2
>
1 + x
1− x
, x ∈ [−1, 1).
Let f(x) := 1+x1−x , x ∈ [−1, 1), then f is clearly increasing and convex.
Let us provide an interpretation of the growth of f . When x is bigger than
0, we notice that f(x) is bigger than 1, which shows that a lack of ambition
the Principal 1, i.e. γ1 < γ2, can be balanced with the efficiency parameter
of her since it exists a domain of x ≥ 0, i.e. for which the Principal 1 is less
ambitious than the Principal 2 but such that the Agent works for the less
ambitious Principal 1.
Turn now to the convexity of f . This phenomenon is quite interesting since
it suggests that when a Principal is clearly more ambitious than the other,
for instance γ1 << γ2, a little modification of the ambition parameters leads
to a high variation of the quotient between the effort of the Agent for the
Principal 1 and for the Principal 2. In other words, if the Principal 1 is
clearly less ambitious than the Principal 2, derived lightly from this state
leads to a big difference of the efforts provides by the Agent to manage
the project of the Principal 1 and the Principal 2. If for instance the Princi-
pal 1 increases a little her ambition, the Agent will manage quite more her
project. There is a kind of leverage effect between a deviation of an initial
ambition parameter and the quantity of work provides to the Agent, when
the two Principal have very different behaviours concerning their relative
performances. Besides, a little modification of the ambition parameter of
a Principal significantly more indifferent than the other with fixed ambi-
tion parameter, increases or decreases meaningfully the range of possible
efficiency parameters to have an Agent more devoted to her project.
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Remark 5.4. As explained in the section above with Proposition 5.2, this case can be
in fact reduced to the classical second best case (with one Principal), by aggregating the
Principals. Thus, we recover the classical interpretations by adding efficiency parameter
γi for project i with i = 1, 2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that in the common agency problem, the value functions
of the Principals should be the solutions of a system of HJB equations, that we
solve when the Principals are risk-neutral. Meanwhile, the coefficients of the
system should satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions. In particular, we study a
model in which two Principals hire a common Agent, and we obtain one of the
main results in [BW86], that is, the outcomewith two non-cooperative employers
and that with an aggregated employer coincide only when the Agent is risk-
neutral.
At the opposite of common agency problem, other works have investigated a
competition problem between two principals who want the exclusive service of
an agent. In 1976, Rothschild and Stiglitz [RS76] have studied insurance markets
in which principals are identical and compete for a single agent. It has then
been extended by Biglaiser and Mezzetti in [BM93] in both moral hazard and
adverse selection cases. This problem is not considered here, because we allows
the agents to be remunerated by all the Principals, and it will be left for future
researches.
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